The usefulness of applied econometrics to the policymaker by Darryl R. Francis
AM DELIGHTED with the invitation to be with
you today and have this opportunity to present a few
of my views regarding the role of applied econo-
metrics to the policymnaker.
Since I am not a builder of econometric models or
a practicing econometrician or statistician, I shall speak
today as a consumer of the results of econometric
models. In broad tenns I shall discuss what I expect
from my research staff and hosv I fold the products of
their labors into my policy recommendations,
Policymakers’ stabilization actions are arrived at
through their judgment about the general course of
economic activity and the effectiveness of various
tools available to them. All policymakers have some
view of how the economy operates and how their
actions affect the economy. This concept or hypothesis
is usually based on years of experience and generally
is not formulated as rigorously as an econometric
model.
I believe that the concepts policynmakers fonn about
the operation of the economy should be constantly
subjected to rigorous scientific analysis. Econometric
models provide a valuable means of formulating and
testing our hypotheses about the economy which can
then be subjected to statistical analysis. In other
words, we can determine whether our beliefs hold
water or have big holes in them.
Before getting into specifics, let me make a few
general remarks about the context within which I see
a role for scientific research. Most of \vhat has been
done by our staff over the years has begun with the
formulation of testable, and therefore deniable, state-
ments or hypotheses. Specifically, we frequently be-
gin merely with the statement of a policymaker to
the effect that if a specific event should occur, then
certain subsequent events will occur. We then seek to
formulate such a statement into a hypothesis in such
a way that it is not a truism. To do so, we state the
conditions which would be acceptable as a denial or
rejection of the hypothesis.
Let me illustrate the importance of this by doing
the opposite. Suppose someone makes a statement
such as “More rainfall may or may not result in a
larger corn crop.” That statement is empty of content
since there is no event which \vould falsify it. In a
nutshell, to engage in worthwhile research, we must
be willing to be wrong. This has been the underlying
philosophy of our research efforts. We seek to pursue
our theoretical formulation and empirical testing in
a professional manner, and then to present our results
for all to exanmine. If subsequent events should prove
us wrong, then we will accept it. In this manner
economic knowledge is advanced.
As a Federal Reserve policymaker I must live in
the real world. Therefore, advice from my staff that I
should support a policy that would shift the LM curve
is of very little use to me. As a member of the Fed-
eral Open Market Committee, I know that the ac-
tions I can vote for are changes in Federal Reserve
holdings of Government securities. As President of a
Federal Reserve Bank, I can recommend to our Board
of Directors that they should submit a change in our
Banks’ discount rate. I cannot recommend to the
Open Market Committee that the LM curve should
be shifted one way or another. I can only recommend
actions in terms of the instruments at hand. The
justification for my position mnust be couched in terms
of the probable effects on prices and employment.
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In recent years, especially with the advent of comu-
puters, there has been a great surge in the amount
of mathematics and statistics used by economists. Al-
though the mathematical trappings of economics may
not seem too impressive to trained mathematicians, to
most policymakers who have only a limited back-
ground in math, they pose a fornidable barrier to
understanding how economists derive their results.
The bewildering struggles that occur between model
builders over specification errors, structural versus
reduced-form models, recursive versus non-recursive
systems, etc., are meaningless to most policymakers.
This is not meant to deny the usefulness of math
and statistics. These are very powerful tools, and
their use has helped to advance knowledge in many
fields of science. However, math is not an empirical
science. When it conmes down to the time of making
a policy recommendation, I must still have a concrete
interpretation in terms of open market operations.
Also, beyond being told what to expect from a given
policy action, I want to have some understanding of
how the results are obtained.
The type of economic nmodels that policymakers use
depends largely upon the goals of their business. For
example, the goal of General Motors is to produce and
sell automobiles in order to maximize the net wealth
of their stockholders. Therefore, GM policymakers
would be interested in understanding the factors in-
fluencing the demand for autos and being able to
forecast such demand.
The goal of the Federal Reserve, at least as I view
it, is to promote high-employment growth svithout
inflation. As a monetary policymaker, Ia minterested
in what the Fed can do to achieve these goals. There-
fore, I have directed our research staff to investigate
the process by which Federal Reserve actions influ-
ence economic activity.
First, I wanted to determine what measure of Fed-
eral Reserve actions was most closely related to ag-
gregate economnic activity. Through extensive research
we have concluded that changes in the money stock
provide a highly reliable means of gauging the effect
of monetary actions on total spending. However, rec-
ognition of this fact alone was only half the battle.
To be at all useful in policy recommendations, it was
necessary to determine whether, with its available
policy instrumnents, the Federal Reserve could control
the growth rate of money. Study of other economists’
work, as well as our own investigative efforts, have
proved conclusively that the money stock can be con-
trolled with a relatively high degree of accuracy.
Page 8
I think it is important at this point to make a dis-
tinction between monetary actions and monetary
policy. For my purposes Ia mnot solely interested in
a measure of the intentions of policymakers. Ia m
primarily interested in the results of their actions. If
the effect of monetary actions is to accelerate money
stock growth and hence accelerate inflation, that is of
interest to me even if the intent of policy \vas to keep
interest rates from rising.
If his research is to be of use to a policymaker, an
economist must be able to tell me the results to be
expected from a particular course of action. For ex-
ample, if the Open Market Committee takes some
action, such as directing the Trading Desk at the
New York Federal Reserve Bank to slow money stock
growth, I would like to know what this means in
terms of the growth of total spending, output, and
prices. There are two extreme situations which are
not very useful to policymakers. One involves magni-
tudes which they control absolutely, but which have
no effect on, or any relationship to, an ultimate policy
objective. The other involves magnitudes which seem
to be good causalpredictors, but which are completely
outside the control of the policymakers.
An economist must state his recommendations in a
form that has empirical content. Ia mnot primarily
interested in statements that express relationships in
abstract terms. I want to know what operations to
direct the Desk to perform and how and when the
performnance of these operations will affect the prices
people pay for goods and services and the number
of people employed.
Therefore, it is not enough for my research staff to
tell me that the Fed can control the money stock. As
a member of the Open Market Committee, I know
the Federal Reserve buys and sells Govermnent se-
curities; it does not fly a blimp across the land dump-
ing out money. The assertion “the Fed can control
the money stock” must be given empirical content in
terms of what the Fed can directly control. The result
of this demand for an operational procedure has led
us to the use of the monetary base concept and the
development of a procedure for determining the
effects of a growth rate of base on growth of the
money stock.
Here, I feel it necessary to say that I think it
should be required of others who recommend that the
Federal Reserve control different variables, such as
interest rates, that they also provide policymakers
with an operational mneans of achieving this control.
It is wrong to accept at face value the statement the
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“Fed can control interest rates” without the cor-
responding explanation of how the Fed can do this,
and what the consequences would be of doing so.
As a policymaker, I amn primarily concerned with
projection of where the ultimate goals are tending
and what will be the effect on these goals if, for in-
stance, the rate of growth of the money stock is
altered. Therefore, we build models to help us under-
stand the effect of gro\vth of the money stock on
policy goals.
As an example of our attemnpts to use models to
understand the effects of monetary policy on the econ-
omy, I could mention the so-called “St. Louis Model.”
The original equation of this model was developed
to test competing conjectures about the relative
strengths of the growth of the money stock and fiscal
actions. How do monetary and fiscal policy actions
interact? Does money matter? Can the Fed continue
an expansionary policy and force fiscal policy to bear
the burden of restraint? As you can see, these are
questions of great importance to a policymaker.
Once the computers have stopped running and
my research staff has analyzed the results, I consider
these results in my policy recommendations, keeping
several points in mind. First, Ia maware that no
model is the absolute truth. All models have had their
hours of glory in addition to their periods that their
creators would prefer not to mention. Second, svhen
attempting to see into the future, it is useful to com-
pare the results of more than one model. When the
results diverge substantially, this is frequently of more
value than when all models give pretty much the
same results. A divergence forces us to examine the
reasons for the discrepancies and carefully think about
the implications of the causes of these differences.
Third, all the results of models must be examined to
see if they are consistent with our accumulated evi-
dence from history, theory, and practical experience.
My personal preference is for small models, rather
than large models, This sterns partly from my vie\v
that the Federal Reserve should be concerned with
the aggregate effects of policy, and should leave the
allocative effects to the operation of the market place.
Also, not being a practicing econometrician, I prefer
models whose operation I can understand. Ia mwill-
ing to trade some so-called “structural richness,” much
of which refers to matters Id onot consider to be the
proper concern of monetary policymakers, for an abil-
ity to understand the process by which the model
arrives at its results. I have never been willing to
simply accept the results of any model. As a policy-
maker, I want to know as fully as possible the basis
for my policy recommendations.
In addition to forecasting, policymakers are also
interested in planning. Forecasts give us some idea of
where the economy is headed, given past policy ac-
tions, However, our job does not end xvith attempts
to analyze the effects of policy actions on the economny
and to forecast subsequent events. We must also en-
gage in planning. This involves determnining desired
future values for prices and employment and deciding
how to achieve these goals. At the planning stage,
both understanding of the economic process and fore-
casting future developments mnust blend together.
When we seek to influence the course of prices and
employment, our research staff is required to use all
of its knowledge about forces influencing the economy
in order to monitor forecasts of the effects of changes
in policy.
These forecasts, upon which we depend in decid-
ing our course of action, involve some assessment of
the pattern of developments to be expected following
a certain action. Let inc be more specific. It is not
sufficient for an economist to tell us that a slower
growth in money will eventually result in a slower
rate of price increase. As a policymaker, I would like
to have better information as to the specific open
market transactions that would achieve, with a high
probability, a desired growth of money. I am also
vitally concerned with the time distribution to be
expected with regard to changes in prices and output
for a given change in the rate of growth of money.
Then I want to know how some tangible results can
be expected with regard to prices and output, and
how the pattern will appear in the data subsequently
reported.
Economic research can never tell policymakers
what are “good” or “just” policy goals. However, by
giving the policymnakers an indication of the expected
results of different policy actions, economic research
can provide a valuable service.
As much as politicians hate to admit it, we live in
a world of trade-offs. One of the gravest diseases
afflicting rational policymaking is the refusal to accept
the fact that we cannot always “have our cake and eat
it too.” I well remember a couple of years ago the
recommendation of the Joint Economic Committee of
Congress that called for the attainment of a 2 percent
rate of inflation and a 3 percent unemployment rate
in a short period of time. All accumulated economic
research indicated that these two goals were mutually
incompatible in the foreseeable future.
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Frequently in the past six years we at the Federal
Reserve have found ourselves perched on the horns
of a dilemma where failure to slow money growth
meant accelerating inflation, but slowing money
growth meant rising interest rates. Unfortunately,
rather than recognize the short-run trade-off implied
by economic research, we have ended up with both
accelerating inflation and higher interest rates, rather
than less inflation and lower interest rates which
longer-range policy planning could have provided.
Monetary policy cannot “fine-tune” out all fluctua-
tions in economic activity. Flowever, given the current
state of economic knowledge, monetary policy can
avoid inducing a high rate of inflation or a recession
in the economy. Thus, I would like policy to remain
neutral with regard to cyclical movements in economic
activity rather than run the risk of reinforcing them.
I believe econometric models have been an aid to
policymakers in outlining the available alternatives,
and, therefore, have added to rational policymaking.
I would like to conclude my remarks by liberally
paraphrasing from an article that appeared in the
Quarterly Journal of Economics some years ago.°
It seems that in a certain kingdom there was a
school for the education of princes approaching man-
hood. Since the king and his court spent much of
their time playing chess, it was decided that the sub-
ject called “games” should be added to the curriculum
of the school. A wizard of the school was assigned
to develop the course.
Since the wizard had never played chess, he cor-
responded with wizards in other kingdoms who told
him that the main concern was that the course in
“games” should be rigorous and intellectually chal-
lenging. Long ago the wizards concluded that chess,
as actually played, was so complicated it was impos-
sible to develop the principles and rules necessary to
teach it in the classroom. Therefore, they introduced
a number of simplifying assumptions which tidied-up
the game and made it much easier to teach and give
exams.
apermission to exempt passages was granted in April 1973. The
original article appeared in the May 1965 Quarterly Journal
of Economics, pp. 209-211.
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Having received a copy of the rules of this game
the wizard began teaching it to his students, passing
those who learned it well, and failing those who did
not adequately master all the rules. The wizard main-
tained an active correspondence with wizards in other
kingdoms, gradually modifying the rules of this game.
For convenience, they referred to the game as chess,
although it was taken for granted that everyone knew
their game was not quite the same as the chess played
in the real world.
One day the king summoned the wizard and asked
him to describe the method used to teach chess in
school. The king was naturally amazed to hear that,
in classroom chess, all pieces moved in straight lines
and the wizard used terms like “jumping men” and
“double jumping” which were Greek to the king; the
wizard never referred to things the king was familiar
with such as queens, rooks, bishops, pawns, and
knights.
Somewhat puzzled, the king asked the wizard if
he had ever observed chess being played in the real
world. The wizard replied, “no, but Id ocarry on
correspondence with other ~vizards. This is better
since everyone knows wizards are smarter than chess
players.”
Then the king asked “After finishing your course,
are the princes better chess players because of what
they learned in your class?”
The wizard replied, “No offense, sir, but we wizards
view the purpose of our courses as being to teach the
princes to think, not to prepare them for a mere
vocation.”
The moral of this little tale for the economics pro-
fession is: “An education in checkers does not prepare
one for a life of chess.”
The moral for the businessman is: “A consultant
who wants to play his own game, rather than yours,
is worthless.”
Like the king in the fable, I too want to be a better
chess player. However, Id onot just want to learn
the abstract rules of the game — I must play in the
real world.
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